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MATSUSHITA: MYTH V. ANALYSIS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF PREDATION
FRANKLIN

I.

M.

FISHER*

INTRODUCTION

Antitrust can be a dry subject. The structural analysis that is usually required may be of great importance, but the general public and even
the legal profession fail to find it as stirring as economists think they
should. The thrill of calculating a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or even
of correctly measuring barriers to entry is not known to those with ordinary tastes.
By contrast, the analysis of conduct, of the dirty tricks played by
would-be monopolists or conspirators, has a fascination that appeals even
to the palate uneducated by exposure to serious economics. Moreover, a
focus on conduct leads to a search for "smoking gun" documents-a
search that lawyers revel in and that can produce results that juries can
understand (or think they do) far better than arguments over market definition and similar subjects. In addition, such a focus fits nicely with the
Populist strain of the antitrust tradition, with its mistrust of large and
powerful firms as in some way deliberately evil.
Behind all this there is the natural human appreciation for a good
story, preferably with heroes and villains. The best such stories are the
simplest-morality plays with the forces of good and evil locked in combat (and the jury invited to root for the good guys or, in the context of
this discussion, the home team). But perhaps the most apt metaphor of
all is that of the fairy tale, with the monopolist as the giant, for example,
menacing his tiny competitors. Antitrust stories are surrounded by such
myths and legends, popularly believed, but often without much sound
basis in fact or economic analysis.
One of the most persistent of antitrust fairy tales is that of predation, with the predator in the role of the wicked witch. Predation can
and sometimes does occur, but far less often than is alleged. Further, the
economic analysis of predation is considerably more sophisticated than
the simple legends.
* Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. B.A. 1956, M.A. 1957,
Ph.D. 1960, Harvard University.
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The Matsushita case, in which I had some involvement, I was a particularly good example of the fairy tale of predation. The principal
myths that usually surround the kernel of possible truth were all present
(together with a few more especially designed for the particular case).
Further, this tale had the added excitement of potentially allowing a jury
to rescue the American victims from a scheming set of foreign villains.
Fortunately, the District Court and, later, the majority of the Supreme
Court recognized the fairy tale for what it was and refused to allow it to
be told to a jury.
As all this suggests, Professor Elzinga and I are in substantial agreement on the analysis of Matsushita.2 My presentation will therefore not
differ so much in substance as in detail and occasionally in emphasis. I
shall concentrate on listing the myths about predation illustrated by
plaintiffs' case.
II.

THE MYTHS OF PREDATION

Myth Number One: All That Is Required to Prove Predation Is to
Show PricingBelow Cost. This is the most wide-spread and important
myth of all. Predation involves an act that is not profit-maximizing without counting the supra-normal profits that follow the destruction of competition. But it is also an act that is profitable when those profits are
counted. Since (as we all know and as is illustrated below) the question
of whether prices are below cost is not a simple one, any test for predation must be in two parts. It is not enough to argue that the act or price
involved was not profitable by itself. One must also show that the act or
price was reasonably expected to bring the supra-normal profits that
would make it profitable. If not, then someone-possibly the defendant
in its business decisions, but more likely the plaintiff's attorneys and experts in their analysis-has made a mistake.
The latter part of this test alone can often be dispositive. In the first
place, predation is not a victimless crime. By its nature, predation must
drive out or suppress competition. Where this is not a reasonable out1. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The original case
was Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981) in
which the district court decided for the defendants on a motion for summary judgment. That decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), and the Third Circuit was in turn reversed by
the Supreme Court. After the decision by the Third Circuit, I was retained by counsel for defendants as a consultant and a potential expert witness should the case be retried.

2. Elzinga, The New InternationalEconomics Applied: Japanese Televisions and U.S. Consumers, 64 CM.-KENT L. REV. 941 (1988) (Professor Elzinga's article appears in this symposium issue).
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come, predation cannot be at work.3 In the Matsushita case, the large
market shares of the American firms still remaining after decades of supposed predation imply that the Japanese alleged predators must either
have had more than the usual dogged determination or been unusually
stupid.
Second, one can reasonably ask whether the supra-normal profits to
be made once predation has destroyed competitors can possibly justify
the loss taken during the predation period. In Matsushita, the Supreme
Court saw very clearly that this justification was most unlikely, and Professor Elzinga has provided a clear and convincing analysis showing that
the game could not reasonably have been worth the candle.
One can go somewhat farther in this case, however, because
Elzinga's conclusion that the Japanese firms' investment in predation was
a definite loser holds for a monopoly predator as well as for the supposed
cartel. The fact that the predation alleged in Matsushita was supposedly
accomplished through a conspiracy further illustrates why it made no
sense.
On plaintiffs' theory, each of the Japanese companies absorbed
losses for a long period of time. For those losses to have been worthwhile, each company must have firmly believed that it would later be
compensated by significant gains. To put it mildly, such assurance of
payoffs would not have been easy to arrange even with explicit and constant communication among the companies.
Consider, first, expectations as to the post-predation period when
the ill-gotten gains are to be shared. For a company to be convinced that
its predatory sacrifices will be duly and proportionally rewarded, it must
believe that the cartelized market will be rigorously divided. This is not
impossible, but cartels have a way of falling apart, and a cartel would
have to be very long-lived to reap the rewards justifying a long predatory
period.
Second, each company in a predatory conspiracy has an incentive
not to cooperate. If the American firms are to be driven out by taking
losses, then it pays to let others take the losses, instead of taking them
oneself.
There is, of course, an exception to all this. If taking the losses oneself also brings on the gains, then one will have an incentive to play one's
assigned role. This would certainly be the case if brand loyalty persisted
beyond the predation period and played an important part in customer
3. On this point, see Fisher, On Predation and Victimless Crime, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 85
(1987).
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decisions. In such a case, a firm that acquired a high market share during the predatory period would be assured of a high share when prices
later rose.
Of course, in a situation of persistent brand loyalty, it is even less
clear than usual how one is to interpret pricing "below cost." If customers who purchase now develop a preference for a particular company's
product, then it may very well be profit-maximizing to offer low prices
now in order to make profits later; this needs no anticompetitive intent or
effect. For example, if quality and dependability are important to customers, then they may pay more for a brand with which they have had
good experience or which has developed a wide reputation for quality
than for one that is as yet untried. In this situation, the return from the
sale of a product is not merely its price, but also the profits that can later
be made when the product's reputation has been established. Taking the
latter profits into account can make it profit-maximizing to compete by
initially selling at a price that is below cost.
Put aside such problems, however, and suppose that below-cost selling is undertaken for predatory reasons and effect, and that brand loyalty
ensures that a high market share gained during the predatory era will
persist into the recoupment period. Such a story needs no conspiratorial
embellishments. If such persistent brand loyalty existed, each separate
firm would have an incentive towards predation, and there would be no
need to conspire to get others to do so.
If, on the other hand, brand loyalty is of minor importance (as appears to be the case with television sets), then it is hard to see how the
conspirators could be kept from cheating and assured of a fair division of
the spoils. Moreover, it is also hard to see how supra-normal profits
could be expected at all in such a case. Without really persistent (and
irrational) brand loyalty, there appear to be no barriers to entry into the
production and marketing of television sets in the United States, and
predatory destruction of domestic competition would not last into the
period of supra-normal pricing.
There is a bit more to it than this, however. If one shuts one's eyes
very tightly and sprinkles a little fairy dust, one can manage to interpret
part of plaintiffs' case as plausibly directed at these issues. I refer to the
agreement on minimum prices ("check" prices) and to the "Five Company Rule."
Nobody likes to lose money unnecessarily, and predators are no exception to this rule. One can imagine a situation in which a particular
Japanese company competes for a contract by offering low prices. The
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customer (a Sears, perhaps) bargains by claiming that it has a lower offer
from a different supplier (presumably another Japanese company), but
does not reveal that supplier's identity. Since the object of the predatory
exercise is to drive out the American firms and not to fight each other, an
agreement on minimum prices, set below the costs of the American firms,
might permit the Japanese companies to avoid pricing their product
lower than necessary.
Similarly, one might imagine that a rule restricting each company to
five American customers would have the effect of focusing the predation,
by making each predator compete for a different set of customers, and
would ensure that each predator took its share of losses. The problem
here is that the "Five Company Rule" did not work this way in practice.
Not only could and did each Japanese company make one of its customers an American subsidiary which could then sell to anyone, but the Rule
restricted rather than mandated selling. As Elzinga remarks:
From an economic perspective, the Five Company Rule runs contrary to the hypothesis of a low price export conspiracy. An organizer
of a predatory cartel might have to say,4 "you must sell to these five"
but not "you are limited to these five."1
Putting aside such doubts, there is the obvious question of how minimum prices and restricted customer allocations could have damaged the
plaintiffs. Here, I think, the plaintiffs deserve a little more credit than
they are usually given. To the extent that such devices were necessary
for the operation of the predatory conspiracy, they contributed to the
losses suffered by plaintiffs. This, I think, was the soundest of plaintiffs'
arguments, or would have been had they articulated it well and consistently. (It did not, of course, sit well with the argument that plaintiffs
were also damaged by a conspiracy to violate the minimum price
agreement.)
In any case, even to reach this part of the plaintiffs' argument requires one to believe several impossible things before breakfast (as the
White Queen says to Alice). In particular, one must believe that the
predatory conduct complained of would make sense for a single, unified
predator, and, as already discussed, it certainly didn't. Further, one
must suppose a very complex and sophisticated use of the minimum price
agreement and the Five Company Rule in an environment with low entry
barriers. In fact, the obvious explanation of the minimum-price agreement and the Five Company Rule lies in the desire of the Japanese to
avoid unnecessary friction in trade relations with the United States.
4. Elzinga, supra note 2, at 961.
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Myth Number Two: Deep Pockets, Warchests, and the Subsidization
of Predation. This myth is less important than the first, but, in different
forms, probably just as widespread. In one form (the "warchest"), it is
the myth that supra-normal profits in one market are used to subsidize
predatory actions in another, and that this observation itself adds something to the analysis of predation. In Matsushita, the subsidizing profits
involved were said to have been earned by an alleged high-price conspiracy in Japan. In its more general form (the "deep pocket"), the myth
asserts that the possession of a large source of cash is an important aspect
of the predatory enterprise.
Of the two versions, the "warchest" story is the more colorful and
the easier to dispose of. If cash resources are to be devoted to the financing of a predatory campaign, what difference can it make where those
resources come from? (I come later to questions of price discrimination
and below-cost pricing.) The decision to invest funds in predation would
be the same whether the funds had been earned in legitimate activities,
laundered by the Mafia, or supplied as unrestricted donations by
philanthropists.
The "deep pocket" version, however, has a bit more to it. Predatory
campaigns do involve losses, and hence the investment of funds. This
requires that the funds be available. If capital markets are imperfect,
firms that have internal sources of funds (deep pockets) may be better
able to make -such investments--or any investments-than firms without
such sources.
Note, incidentally, that this argument implies that plaintiffs did
have an interest in proving a conspiracy in the Japanese home market. If
the only source of funds for investment in predation came from that
conspiracy, then predation abroad required conspiracy at home. This
might have made plaintiffs' evidence on the home-market conspiracy
more than a prejudicial irrelevance.
The problem, of course, is that it is hard to believe that such funds
could not have been found elsewhere. If investment in predation was
really profitable, surely large companies would find the funds for it from
other sources. While it is indeed implausible that lenders would have
provided funds for so risky a venture as the alleged predatory conspiracy
in Matsushita, this is not because of any imperfections in the capital market. Rather, it is because the investment required was plainly going to be
unprofitable.
To put it another way, not only is it hard to see why outside lenders
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would put up the money for such an adventure, it is hard to see why
anyone would. As Elzinga states:
If enormous profits were, in fact, being made in the Japanese
home market, this might have afforded the Japanese sellers the ability
to finance a costly predatory campaign in the United States. It does
not provide the motive 5
Myth Number Three: Charging Different Prices in Different Markets Implies Below-Cost Pricing in the Low-Price Market. This myth is
closely related to the charge of dumping which was also an issue in the
Matsushita case.
In Matsushita,the analytic core of the plaintiffs' claim on this point
was as follows. The Japanese companies were alleged to charge higher
prices in Japan than in the United States. Because a television set sold in
the United States could have been sold in Japan for a higher price, selling
it in the United States was thus a below-cost sale, taking opportunity
costs into account.
I put aside the factual question of whether prices for comparable
items were in fact higher in Japan than in the U.S. (defendants claimed
they were not), and consider the analytic issues involved. Here, one must
consider different assumptions about market structures, and I shall begin
by taking the extreme form of the plaintiffs' claims about the Japanese
home market.
Suppose then, for the moment, that a single firm had monopolized
the Japanese home market and was shipping products into the United
States at a lower price than the monopoly price in Japan. Does a proper
treatment of opportunity costs imply that the United States price is below cost because a television set sold in the United States could have been
sold at a higher price in Japan?
The answer to this question is in the negative. The return that such
a monopolist gives up if it sells a television set in the United States rather
than in Japan is not the price in Japan but the marginal revenue there. A
profit-maximizing monopolist producing for two markets from a common set of plants will operate so as to equalize marginal revenue in the
two markets. If one market is competitive and the other monopolized, it
will operate so as to make price in the competitive market equal to marginal revenue in the monopolized one. Since marginal revenue is below
price in the monopolized market, a lower price in the United States than
in Japan is perfectly consistent with profit maximization, and thus does
not imply below-cost pricing in the U.S.
5. Elzinga, supra note 2, at 963-64.
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A similar analysis applies when an oligopoly rather than a monopoly is involved. If, as plaintiffs alleged, the Japanese market was
cartelized and supra-normal profits were earned, then those profits were
earned through a restriction of output. As with the monopolist, the opportunity cost incurred by selling output in the U.S. rather than in Japan
was not the price in Japan but the full effects of expanding output in
Japan on the cartel's supra-normal profits there. These effects made the
marginal return from the sale of more output in Japan less than the Japa6
nese sales price.
Finally, suppose that the Japanese market were competitive. Here
the story is a bit more complex, but not more favorable to plaintiffs
(whose case as presented, of course, involved a heavy claim that the Japanese market was cartelized). In the first place, if the two markets were
really separate, then there would be no reason to expect the two competitive prices to be the same.
This does not end the matter, however, because the two markets
were not separate; the same facilities were used to produce television sets
for both. In this circumstance, the competitive equilibrium of price equal
to marginal cost should have produced the same price in each market,
since marginal costs were (arguendo) the same.
The problem here is that one cannot conclude from this argument
and the (alleged) fact of lower prices in the U.S. than in Japan that below-cost selling was taking place in the U.S. market. All that one can say
is that it cannot be true that both markets were in competitive equilibrium. Since the appealing hypothesis (and the one urged by the plaintiffs) is the usual inference that the high-price market (Japan) was not
competitive, it is hard to make much of this argument in an American
antitrust action about predatory prices.
III.

MORAL

Below-cost pricing is an oft-repeated fear. Especially when foreign
competition is involved, competitors are likely to complain when market
6. Plaintiffs suggested that the restriction of output required for the high-price conspiracy in
Japan left the Japanese companies with excess capacity, which in turn enabled them to sell at a low
price in the United States. Assuming this was true, it is hard to see what it has to do with predation.
Such an argument simply suggests that the marginal costs of producing goods for the U.S. market
were sufficiently low as to make low prices profitable. While it may be true that the U.S. prices in
such a case would be below the average variable cost of all output (domestic and export) taken
together, they would not be below the average variable cost of the output at issue-the output produced for export. To make such an argument is to misunderstand the point of the Areeda-Turner
average variable cost criterion. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under

Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). "
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prices are below their own costs, or even if prices are below what they
would like them to be. While the story of predation is analytically sound,
in the sense that it provides a consistent theory in which below-cost pricing takes place, the special nature of the story makes its applicability
narrower than legend would suggest. Many economists find the predatory story hard (although not impossible) to believe. Fortunately, in
Matsushita, where the story was truly incredible, the Supreme Court also
refused to believe it.

